ABSTRACT The widespread adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT) technologies has drastically increased the breadth and depth of attack surfaces in networked systems, providing new mechanisms for the intrusion. In the context of smart-world critical infrastructures and cyber-physical systems, the rapid adoption of the IoT systems and infrastructures without thorough consideration for the risks and vulnerabilities has the potential for catastrophic damage to the privacy, safety, and security of individuals and corporations. While the IoT systems have the potential to increase productivity, accountability, traceability, and efficiency, their potential weaknesses are also more abundant. In this paper, we provide critical consideration of the security of the IoT systems as applied to smart-world critical infrastructures. Particularly, we carry out a detailed assessment of vulnerabilities in IoT-based critical infrastructures from the perspectives of applications, networking, operating systems, software, firmware, and hardware. In addition, we highlight the three key critical infrastructure IoT-based cyber-physical systems, namely the smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid. Moreover, we provide a broad collection of attack examples upon each of the key applications. Furthermore, we introduce a case study, in which we assess the impacts of potential attacks on critical IoT-based systems, using the smart transportation system as an example. Finally, we provide a set of best practices and address the necessary steps to enact countermeasures for any generic IoT-based critical infrastructure system. INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical systems, Internet of Things, security, critical infrastructure, case study, computing infrastructure.
With the rapid development of IoT that can be used to support smart-world critical infrastructure systems, innumerable sensors and actuators, both of which are called IoT devices in general in this paper, are being deployed so that monitoring and control capacities across a variety of CPS/IoT domains can be enabled. Given their increasing popularity and the novel applications they can enable, the volume of IoT devices deployed and in use is expected to reach approximately 31 billion by the year 2020 [12] , and will only continue increase in number. Nonetheless, cyber-threats could pose serious security risks to IoT devices, disrupting the effectiveness of the systems supported by IoT devices. Smart devices have repeatedly been demonstrated to be vulnerable and were easily employed in a recent attack on October 21, 2016 . This attack caused numerous popular websites becoming unreachable [13] . This attack was raised by a number of unknowingly compromised, mass-produced smart consumer devices such as webcams and related products. Other recently exposed vulnerabilities in critical smart systems include implantable cardiac devices susceptible to remote reprogramming and rapid battery depletion [14] , widespread ''mission-critical'' vulnerabilities in smart weapons systems for the US military [15] , [16] , and ransomware attacks that disrupted 34 % of England's Nation Health Service [17] . As an emerging threat, IoT security and susceptibility to intrusion reaches all aspects of society, implicating all domains of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and smart-world systems. The typical examples of such systems include the smart home, smart grid, smart transportation, smart manufacturing, smart healthcare, and others.
For instance, the smart manufacturing system, that is, IoT applied to industrial systems to greatly improve productivity, and operational and resource efficiencies [6] , [18] , has seen its share of cyber-attacks [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] , which have typically targeted the disruption of regular operation, such as the Stuxnet worm for gaining control of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) [25] and malware attacks on HVAC systems [26] . The smart transportation system that interconnects vehicles, infrastructure (e.g., road side units (RSUs)), people, and the Internet [27] [28] [29] has been shown be vulnerable, allowing for the full remote control of the vehicle, as well as vehicle impersonation and the sending of false information to RSUs, nearby vehicles, etc. via Sybil attacks [30] [31] [32] . The smart grid, which integrates massively numerous electrical microgrids via extensive two-way communications between power suppliers and consumers relies heavily on the availability of measurement data to conduct accurate and real-time state estimation and efficient system operations. Nonetheless, effective and efficient operations of the smart grid have shown vulnerabilities to the disturbance of state estimation via data integrity attacks, false data injection attacks, and so on [5] , [9] , [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . The smart healthcare system, which aims to improve patient care through a growing number of sensors that assess patient health conditions, must adhere to strict oversight and regulation requirements for data confidentiality [41] [42] [43] . Yet, despite these regulations, a number of smart healthcare systems have been subverted, including by viruses like WannaCry, Medjack [44] and SamSam that disrupted hospitals as recently as February 2018, and via potentially life-threatening vulnerabilities such as those found in the Carelink 2090 pacemaker.
While a number of research efforts have been conducted toward enhancing the security of critical infrastructure systems, the majority of existing research has focused only on the vulnerabilities of sensing and measurements, such as data integrity attacks against measurement devices, and a comprehensive investigation into the impacts of vulnerable actuators on the critical infrastructure systems themselves has not been explored. For instance, intrusions of IoT devices have increased dramatically due to IoT devices being much easier to compromise than conventional devices, owing to their limited resources, lack of security software, multitude of network interfaces (Ethernet, Bluetooth, WiFi, ZigBee, etc.), and human factors like not changing default passwords. For these reasons, vulnerabilities abound, and the sheer volume of devices make distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks the primary use for those subverted. Thus, there is an imminent need for a systematic exploration of the space of attacks against IoT systems (smart plugs, smart bulbs, smart manufacturing controllers, etc.) in critical smart infrastructure systems, investigation into the risks of those attacks, and development of countermeasures for their mitigation.
To fulfill this need, and to assess all aspects of IoT-based cyber threats thoroughly and completely, we investigate vulnerabilities of IoT systems from the perspectives of the network layer, operating system, software, firmware, and hardware. Vulnerabilities in the network layer can be allocated into six attack surfaces, which are the device networking service, device web interface, mobile application, cloud interface, privacy, and network traffic. For example, adversaries can attack the device network service through vulnerabilities that include unencrypted services, poorly implemented encryption, and denial of service. Vulnerabilities in the operating system can be grouped via administrative interface, update mechanism, and privacy. Likewise, software vulnerabilities can be identified by third-party backend application programming interfaces (APIs) and vendor backend APIs. The device firmware and update mechanism are categories of firmware vulnerabilities. Finally, device hardware (sensors) and physical device interfaces are categories of the hardware vulnerabilities.
To investigate cyber-attacks in IoT systems, we first propose a three-layer architecture (i.e., service layer, operation layer, and management layer) to study the key IoT systems, such as smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid. The service layer consists of various services, such as the mobility management service and the driver assistant service in smart transportation, the raw material supplement service and the smart logistics service in smart manufacturing, and the distributed energy integration and storage service in smart grid. The operation layer ensures safe and efficient operation on diverse systems, including route management operation and turn-by-turn navigation operation in smart transportation, function and process automation operation in smart manufacturing, and demand response and energy distribution in smart grid. The management of IoT systems ranges from information management to emergency management, which ensures key modules in IoT are functioning properly, such as information, maintenance, facility management, among others.
From the perspective of the three-layer architecture outlined, we next consider cyber-attacks on several representative smart-world systems, including smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid, detailing the attack targets, definitions, examples, and impacts. Then, we study the impacts of both individual small-scale and combinatorial large-scale attacks in disrupting IoT system service, operation and management in the cases of smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid. Moreover, we conduct a case study on the impacts of cyber-attacks on smart transportation via extensive experimentation. In particular, we study the least-effort attack (achieving target objectives, such as disruption of a vehicular network and traffic, with minimum attack cost) on smart transportation. The results demonstrate that a combined attack on both vehicles (signal transmission) and traffic lights (frequency) can obtain maximum damage (i.e., denial of service and traffic congestion) via manipulating the least number of vehicles or traffic lights.
Finally, we propose countermeasures to protect IoT systems from cyber-attacks via a generalized three-phase framework. In the first phase, we shall investigate the risks of cyber-attacks on diverse IoT systems, considering system vulnerabilities, impacts of vulnerabilities on key functions, and optimal attack strategies from the perspective of an adversary. In the second phase, we shall investigate defensive schemes based on the design of resilient IoT-based systems, optimal IoT-based system configurations, effective cyberattack detection, and timely cyber-attacks response. In the third phase, we shall leverage an integrated experimentation platforms to capture the dynamics of IoT systems and evaluate the performance of the proposed defensive schemes, utilizing tools such as the Fenix framework for Network CoSimulation (FNCS) in simulating the smart grid system [11] , OMNET++, SUMO, and Veins for simulating the smart transportation system [45] , and the wireless cyber-physical simulator (WCPS) for simulating the smart manufacturing system [46] .
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we provide categorical study of IoT vulnerabilities. In Section III, we describe key applications in IoT from the perspective of our three-layer architecture. In Section IV, we present a study of cyber-attacks on IoT applications, outlining attack targets, examples, and impacts. In Section V, we present our own case study investigating least effort cyberattacks on the smart transportation system. In Section VI, we discuss security countermeasures in IoT from the perspectives of risk assessment, defensive schemes, and testing and evaluation platforms. Finally, in Section VII, we provide concluding remarks.
II. IOT VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we categorically investigate vulnerabilities in IoT. To achieve a clear picture of the IoT vulnerability landscape [47] , we subdivide IoT systems based on a traditional layered or tiered structure. We then identify the IoT attack surfaces and classifying the vulnerabilities.
In considering vulnerabilities in IoT, we first consider a basic layered computer system structure to divide the IoT system. In this case, we have identified five primary layers in the IoT system: the network layer, the operating system, software, firmware, and hardware. Fig. 1 shows a breakdown of the layered structure, as well as the subdivisions of each layer that make up our entire classification scheme. We now present each layer in detail, along with the attack surfaces and vulnerabilities.
A. NETWORK LAYER
The network layer is where the IoT devices transfer data. This data transfer requires the support of various protocols, such as TCP/IP protocol. Based on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model, we consider attack surfaces to reside primarily in the network application layer. In the network application layer, there exist six attack surfaces. These attack surfaces are the device network service, device web interface, mobile application, cloud interface, privacy and network traffic.
1) DEVICE NETWORKING SERVICE
The device network service attack surface is where all communication services are running. This attack surface has three kinds of vulnerabilities, which are (i) Unencrypted Service. The unencrypted service vulnerability is one in which data is transferred in clear text, readable by anyone that can receive the data. In this case, an adversary can listen to the communication via Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) [48] , [49] attack, as demonstrated in Fig. 2. (ii) Poorly Implemented Encryption. It is a vulnerability in which the encryption implemented in a system is either poorly configured or the is out of date (Like the SSLv2/v3) and therefore ineffective. Just as in the prior vulnerability, the MITM attack can be used here as well. (iii) Denial of Service. It controls millions of compromised devices to send requests to one victim simultaneously over some duration of time [50] . An example is the Memcached Amplification Attack [51] that occurred on Feb 28, 2018, which is called an amplification attack because it exploits a disparity in bandwidth consumption between an adversary and the targeted web resources. This attack only requires a small query and can instigate huge attack traffic. Additionally, DRDoS attacks on IoT devices have demonstrated methods to affect IoT devices without compromising them [52] .
2) DEVICE WEB INTERFACE, MOBILE APPLICATION, AND CLOUD INTERFACE
Because these three attack surfaces have the same four kinds of vulnerabilities, we illustrate these vulnerabilities only once in the following to reduce repetition. The device web interface one is usually displayed as a login page. The mobile application is the most common, otherwise denoted as an app, with examples like Facebook, Twitter and many others. These applications also have login functions or pages equivalent to those of the device web interface attack surface. The cloud interface is relevant to cloud computing.
We now illustrate some threats against those three attack surfaces as follows: (i) Username Enumeration. The username enumeration vulnerability is a kind of brute force attack in which the adversary will attempt login using several different usernames from a dictionary. If one of the usernames matches the username in the website, other services' databases will return information indicating ''password incorrect''. Then, the adversary knows the username matched, and he or she will only need to guess the correct password to compromise the IoT system. Another case study on general IoT vulnerabilities has illustrated the damage of such attacks [53] . (ii) Weak Password. It is generally self-explanatory, where users set very simple or common passwords, often only comprised of numbers or characters. For example, '1111111', 'password', and 'birthdaycake' are typical weak passwords. Weak password like the examples make the compromise of victim devices quite simple with brute force attacks. Several articles mentioned these risks as they pertain to IoT devices [53] , [54] . (iii) Account Lockout. The account lockout vulnerability uses a brute force attack to trigger security mechanisms that include lockout (temporarily disabled login) of normal users from their accounts, denying them access [55] . Additionally, cases where systems do not have account lockout can be dangerous to IoT devices [53] , revealing to an adversary the potential to brute force attack the login and password indefinitely. (iv) Two-factor Authentication. The two-factor authentication [56] vulnerability is one, in which the two-factor authorization process is compromised by an adversary to gain entry. The adversary could use a company's credentials or build a low-cost honey-pot-like server to intercept the two-factor data transmissions.
3) PRIVACY
The privacy attack surface gained significant attention recently, especially in the context of IoT devices. For instance, smart home devices like smart IP cameras, smart IR motion sensors, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) speakers, sometimes called all-weather monitor sensors or smart IoT devices, may have access to significant amounts of personal data through various user accounts, as well as real-time spatial or positional information. If these devices are compromised, the volume of private information revealed will be quite damaging. On this attack surface, we define the following kinds of vulnerabilities: (i) Username Disclosure. The username disclosure vulnerability involves an adversary retrieving the username information of the user. With this information, the adversary can then apply the password dictionary in a brute-force attack to guess the password and compromise the system. This has been demonstrated in a real-world case of IP camera ID leakage [57] . (ii) User/Device Location Disclosure. This kind of vulnerability implicates very sensitive private information. If the device location disclosed, an adversary could launch an attack with minimal resources deployed to a localized target area, or could implement a more damaging attack using knowledge of the target's location and surroundings, such as affecting the power grid or inducing traffic congestion. The risk of location disclosure in IoT devices has been well illustrated, and the introduction of dynamic location agents and location obfuscation mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate it [58] . Differential privacy is a statistical mechanism that attempts to maximize query accuracy and minimize privacy impact on users by quantifying privacy loss and introducing randomness to thwart message reconstruction. Examples using differential privacy have been shown to keep the output of IoT databases safe [59] .
4) NETWORK TRAFFIC
The network traffic attack surface includes the vulnerability of many communication protocols, such as the WiFi, Zigbee, Z-wave and so on. Recent attack examples include the recent Z-wave downgrade attack [60] , in which the adversary exploited a vulnerability to downgrade the device security level from S2 to S 0 . The vulnerability towards WiFi network encryption method (WPA2) is a kind of key reinstallation attack. It has an impact on every device using wireless network hardware. The encrypted WiFi network uses the fourway handshake and this attack can trick a victim to reinstall an already-in-use key. This kind of attack can also hijack the TCP streams and add malicious content to them [61] . For the Bluetooth aspect, a cryptographic bug detected on July 24, 2018 and tracked as CVE-2018-5383. This vulnerability can affect Apple, Broadcom, Intel, Qualcomm, and some headset devices. This kind of attack takes place when two devices are do the paring. Since some devices do not support validating the cryptographic key exchange so that the adversary can install a fake key to obtain the session key to listen the communication [62] . For the ZigBee part, the communication between two ZigBee devices sometimes use the default key in Aug. 2018. It enables the adversaries to establish an MITM attack [63] .
B. OPERATING SYSTEM
The operating system is the most important software in any multipurpose computing device, as it can make full use of the hardware resources and provide some common and useful services to user applications. On the operating system layer, we consider the following attack surfaces.
1) ADMINISTRATIVE INTERFACE
This attack surface implicates the operating system login and authorization processes [64] . This includes username enumeration, weak password, and account lockout vulnerabilities. The detailed descriptions of these vulnerabilities can be found in the Section II-A.2 of the network layer.
2) UPDATE MECHANISM
It is a critically important part of the operating system for resolving the known vulnerabilities, updating to the newest functionality, etc. Nonetheless, if the upgrade file is modified, it becomes easy for an adversary to change vital parts of the system and gain unintended access to the device. This attack surface has four kinds of vulnerabilities: (i) Update Transmission Without Encryption. When an update file is transmitted to clients without encryption, like TLS v1.2 [65] , the update mechanism becomes an attack surface. The update file sent in clear text can easily be modified by an adversary to compromise system integrity [66] , either by blocking and replacing the file in transit or by substituting the modified update file to unsuspecting hosts from the start. (ii) Update Location Writable. The update location writable vulnerability occurs when the update file stored in a server, ready to be deployed, can be modified by firmware before distribution to the users. This has the same result as the update sent without encryption [66] . (iii) No Manual Update Mechanism. When no manual update mechanism exists, the client cannot verify and install updates offline, only receiving the update when the server pushes an update package to all users. An adversary can thus launch an attack before the server delivers a new update to clients if the old version has some vulnerability [47] . (iv) Missing Update Mechanism. When no update mechanism exists, an adversary can use any existing vulnerability to compromise the whole system, because no patch can be applied to protect against known vulnerabilities [47] .
3) PRIVACY
The privacy attack surface has the similar three vulnerabilities as mentioned in Section 2.1.3 of the network layer. This attack surface is similarly important in the operating system layer, and has been shown to be of particular importance in IoT devices [67] .
C. SOFTWARE
In the software layer, we consider programs and applications designed for user and automated machine tasks, interfacing, and interaction. As a primary component of software VOLUME 7, 2019 systems, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) specify protocols, tools, data structures and communication between multiple subcomponents and subroutines of complex software systems to obfuscate underlying operation and allow for easy interfacing between components. These APIs are a critical component in the software layer and the OS, dividing complex systems into small manageable parts, improving cohesion and reliability between units to improve the system's maintainability and extendibility. In this layer, there are two primary attack surfaces: third-party backend APIs and vendor backend APIs.
1) THIRD-PARTY BACKEND APIS
Third-party backend APIs are used for application software running on operating systems, such as the Google Maps API. In this case, if the API is out of date, an adversary could gain unintended application access or data, such as the location in the Google Maps case. On this attack surface, the vulnerability is the insecure third-party components. Cases of third-party components being insecure include out-of-date or unpatched software, such as old versions of BusyBox, SSH, and so on. Old software has a higher likelihood of vulnerabilities and are typically easier to compromise [68] .
2) VENDOR BACKEND APIS
Unlike third-party APIs, vendor APIs provide software interfaces to get access to hardware. For example, hardware maintenance software uses vendor backend APIs to get hardware information. If these APIs are modified or subverted, users will not receive correct information, such as the hardware data their application depends upon [57] .
D. FIRMWARE
In distinguishing firmware from the operating system, the firmware can be the simplified startup software, bootloader, or bootstrap program that loads the operating system, and is directly installed on the hardware. As an example, BIOS is a firmware that is used daily, which checks the hardware at startup and loads the operating system. Thus, the firmware is the lowest level software that can directly take full control of the hardware. This attack surface has two kinds of vulnerabilities, the first is the same as one in the operating system layer, called the update mechanism, and the second is the device firmware attack surface.
1) UPDATE MECHANISM
This mechanism is similar to Section 2.2.2 of the operating system layer. The difference here is that, if the firmware is compromised, the results may be more serious than in the operating system layer, as an adversary has the additional capacity to directly change the hardware values and destroy the system physically.
2) DEVICE FIRMWARE
This vulnerability is based on the directly on the firmware itself. It includes only a single vulnerability, called firmware and storage extraction. Through it, an adversary can use some methods to extract useful information, including the source code, the binary file of a running service, pre-set passwords, and SSH keys, among others [69] . Typically, this means using JTAG or SWD debugging interfaces [70] . More specifically, JTAG is a standard of on-chip instrumentation in Electronics Design Automation (EDA), an industry standard for printed circuit board testing. JTAG leaves a convenient low-level backdoor for programmers to carry out testing, giving them the highest privilege and full access to the entire printed circuit board. Similarly, while the UART interface provides a higher-level software/command shell, logger output, and others distinct from JTAG, it still has a backdoor for programmers to have the highest privilege. Generally speaking, firmware and some potentially sensitive data will be stored on a portable chip, and could thus be extracted via JTAG or UART interface [71] , easily granting an adversary access to the sensitive data.
E. HARDWARE
In the hardware layer, we consider the partial or full control of system hardware and potential subversion or damage. In some cases, an adversary can reach the hardware directly, such that the protection policy may not be very effective. From this perspective, we divide the attack surface into two parts: the hardware (sensors, actuators), and the device physical interface.
1) HARDWARE (SENSORS)
On this attack surface, the adversary can use various means to compromise sensors and actuators, instantiating false data to confuse the control system administrator and the decision making process. The system may then carry out incorrect decisions and damage the hardware or components of the system. An example is the Stuxnet worm, which compromises the sensors of the nuclear power generation facility and compromises the control system to destroy the nuclear power plant [72] .
2) DEVICE PHYSICAL INTERFACE
This attack surface is based on the access interface between hardware and firmware. This attack surface has the following three vulnerabilities: (i) Removal of Storage Media. This vulnerability is based upon connected portable storage media that could be physically removed, leading to disconnection or disfunction of services, applications, or the device itself, as well as the potential for compromised portable devices to infect the devices and systems. An example is the first version of Stuxnet, which used USB devices to compromise nuclear power plants. Adversaries could also use vulnerabilities in the hardware or firmware to steal important credentials from physically extracted removable storage devices [57] , [73] .
(ii) Manipulation of Device Code Execution Flow. Manipulating the code execution flow of a device is a vulnerability that can make use of JTAG and the GNU Project debugger (GDB). The GDB enables to observe the execution of another program, or what a program was doing at the moment it crashed. Here, adversaries could modify the execution of firmware so that almost all software-based security controls can be bypassed [57] , [73] . (iii) Obtaining Console Access. Obtaining console access is similar to the firmware and storage extraction vulnerability in Section 2.4.2. Here, an adversary could use some method (like UART or JTAG) to gain full access to a serial interface. Usually, security measures (e.g., custom bootloaders) are capable of preventing adversaries from going to single user mode, but these have occasionally been bypassed and are not completely secure [57] , [73] .
III. KEY IOT APPLICATIONS
In this section, we investigate key IoT applications, including smart transportation, smart manufacturing and smart grid, from a three-layer architecture perspective. This three-layer architecture consists of service, operation, and management layers, which represent the key components of CPS. In considering the applications and their layers, we provide individualized examples of the service, operation, and management layers in each of the applications (smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid individually).
A. SMART TRANSPORTATION 1) SERVICE LAYER
Smart transportation provisions many add-on services, including mobility management, driver assistance, vehicle management, and infotainment, among others, to enhance the driving experiences of users under the restrictions of driving safety [74] [75] [76] . Mobility management is intended to significantly reduce the time of different driving tasks, including finding the shortest route to a destination, assisting with parking, and so on. The driver assistant is designed to assist drivers in safely operating their vehicles, through methods such as lane change assistance and collision prevention, to name a few. Vehicle management aims to assist drivers in vehicle maintenance through mechanisms such as vehicle condition monitoring, and detecting and preventing faults, among others. For instance, Apple Carplay, as a representative infotainment system, enables full integration of information technology and mobile applications in vehicles [77] . Combined with a distraction-free interface, such integration can enable location services, navigation, infotainment, and so on to enhance the driving experience. Specifically, many infotainment services include music to relax or stimulate drivers to avoid and relieve driving fatigue. Note that driving fatigue is the cause of more than 20 % of traffic accidents [78] .
2) OPERATION LAYER
In addition to the add-on services mentioned above, another key objective of smart transportation is to enable safe and efficient transportation system operations, including route optimization, turn-by-turn navigation, and information-centric multimedia streaming (ICMS), among others. Route optimization utilizes information technologies to assist drivers in computing optimal routes based on current real-time traffic conditions [4] , [79] , [80] . Route optimization can be configured to achieve a variety of objectives, including minimizing the average time per trip, maximizing fuel efficiency, and others. Turn-by-turn navigation assists drivers in efficiently operating their vehicles to reach their destinations. Likewise, by enabling ICMS, drivers can make timely decisions based on video streams collected from upcoming traffic locations [81] .
3) MANAGEMENT LAYER
Many management systems in exist and play critical roles in smart transportation, such as information management, maintenance and construction management, and emergency management [82] , [83] . Information management is concerned with the timely delivery of critical information, such as schedule, traffic, weather, and so on. Maintenance and construction VOLUME 7, 2019 management aims to efficiently maintain transportation systems, seeking to sustain good operating conditions and minimize system downtime. Emergency management ensures the safety of drivers and pedestrians during emergency scenarios, enabled by a variety of safety functions, such as driver assisting systems (DAS), collision avoidance systems, emergency condition notifications, and vehicle health monitoring, diagnosis and maintenance, to name a few. For example, DAS can assist drivers in operating vehicles safely during emergency scenarios, such as during poor driving conditions (rain, fog, and darkness, among others). The DAS provides several features enabled by smart transportation, including real-time imaging of roads, real-time geospatial database for vehicle navigation, on-vehicle sensors to detect surroundings, and more [84] . Emergency condition notification enables a number of vehicles to participate in the broadcasting emergency messages, such that all drivers will be notified appropriately.
B. SMART MANUFACTURING 1) SERVICE LAYER
Smart manufacturing enables the interconnectivity of industrial things, including sensors, actuators, logistics, machines, etc., on a closed-loop supply chain to support many industrial services [6] , [85] , [86] . Key industrial services consist of raw material supply, smart logistics, goods production, inventory management, and consumption [18] . Raw material supply includes the storing, moving, and consumption of raw materials efficiently during production (e.g., producing the maximum volume of goods at minimum cost). Inventory management seeks the efficient management of production speed with regard to customer demand. Smart logistics introduces the cost-effective scheduling of massively dispersed goods delivery.
2) OPERATION LAYER
Operation of smart manufacturing (i.e., smart factories and plants) through the interconnectivity of sensors, actuators, and controllers, includes function and process automation, failure mitigation and safety control, and fault detection, diagnosis, and self-healing [87] , [88] . Note that control systems that could be operated by supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), distributed control system (DCS), and so on, play critical roles to operate industrial systems. Function and process automation leverages seamless data collection and command dissemination to conduct continuous production processes without human intervention. Failure mitigation and safety control could prevent unsafe operation conditions, reduce health risks, and protect workers. Control systems could detect and diagnose faults automatically and induce self-healing mechanisms to recover from system faults.
3) MANAGEMENT LAYER
The management of production devices, including robotics, sensors, controllers, etc. can be improved via automation and visualization of production environments, which includes production monitoring, availability management, quality management, and predictive maintenance [89] [90] [91] . Production monitoring is real-time manufacturing monitoring and data collection to ensure normal operations and production efficiency of manufacturing machines and personnel. Availability management indicates the analysis and management of the availability of facilities, machinery, personnel, etc. in plants and factories to maximize their productivity and efficiency. Quality management examines the quality of the production processes and output, and identifies defective products. Finally, predictive maintenance can effectively improve productivity by reducing equipment downtime through predictive maintenance scheduling.
C. SMART GRID 1) SERVICE LAYER
The smart grid leverages and interconnects power grids, transmission lines, substations, and consumers via cuttingedge technologies, and enables a variety of services to improve reliability and efficiency, through technologies such as distributed energy integration and storage, electric vehicle-to-grid infrastructures, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), and so on [101] [102] [103] . Distributed energy integration and storage combines distributed renewable-energy generation facilities (i.e., solar plants, wind turbines, thermal power facilities, etc.) with distributed energy storage facilities [9] , [10] , [10] , [104] , [105] . Such integration enables a two-way electricity power transmission (between consumers and grids) that is aware of energy demand and supply. Electric vehicle-to-grid infrastructure integrates plugin electric vehicles with the smart grid, increasing the use of renewable-energy and reducing dependence on fossil-fuel energy resources. In addition, AMI leverages smart meters to measure, collect, and analyze energy supply and usage in real time to benefit both consumers and grids through mechanisms such as dynamic energy pricing [106] .
2) OPERATION LAYER
Smart grid system operations consist of demand response, energy distribution optimization, self-healing, emission reduction, and so on to achieve efficient energy generation, transmission, and utilization [105] , [107] [108] [109] . Demand response operation can balance power supply and demand. For example, users can transmit power (generated or stored) back into the smart grid system during peak electricity demand periods. Power distribution systems in the smart grid leverage automation technologies to transmit electricity at low cost and with high flexibility specifically for distributed energy sources. Moreover, as a key operation, self-healing enables automatic diagnosis of system failures in the smart grid and restores the system to normal operations. Moreover, enabled by the smart grid, the efficient utilization of electricity can significantly reduce energy waste and carbon emissions. 
3) MANAGEMENT LAYER
Management in the smart grid includes grid monitoring management, meter data management, and substation management, among others [108] , [110] . Grid monitoring improves visualization for system operators and enables the self-detection of grid instabilities. Meter data management incorporates critical information delivery, storage, and processing, including the status information for transmission and distribution systems, generation system, and more. Substation management can rapidly configure substations in the smart grid to improve the system flexibility. For example, traditionally, a main trunk carries the majority of electricity from a substation to customers, delivered through laterals. In the smart grid, however, distributed energy resources can be connected to multiple substations to enable an interconnected feeder system.
IV. CYBER-ATTACKS ON IOT APPLICATIONS
In this section, we investigate cyber-attacks on smart transportation, smart manufacturing and smart grid, and consider their impacts. In particular, for each of the three key IoT applications (i.e., smart transportation, smart manufacturing, and smart grid), we first list the cyber-attacks, outlining the attack targets, definition, examples, and impacts. We then consider in more detail the impacts of both single small-scale and complex large-scale attacks upon the service, operation, and management layers. Table 1 provides a list of attacks on smart transportation, including their definitions, impacts, and examples. In the following, we illustrate the impacts of attacks from the perspectives of a single attack and a large-scale attack on the three layers of our outlined architecture.
A. ATTACKS ON SMART TRANSPORTATION

1) ATTACKS ON SERVICE
Koscher et al. [118] investigated attacks on automobiles from disabling brakes to disrupting entertainment services. In particular, they noted the lack of security protections (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms) during communication as one of the primary vulnerability risks of IoT [119] . In considering individual attacks, adversaries could attack vehicle management services (e.g., tire monitoring) by spoofing the sensed data with false data to disrupt driving [98] , [120] , [121] . Moreover, in a large-scale cyber-attack, a massive number of vehicles will be negatively affected. For example, adversaries could interfere with the vehicle management service (e.g., remote operation) of many vehicles.
2) ATTACKS ON OPERATION
Attacks on operations can directly result in inefficient vehicle operation and failure. For example, failure on route management leads to higher trip costs and can further result in congestion. In this case, adversaries can delay the delivery of traffic condition messages to disrupt efficient route management systems on vehicles. Considering a single smallscale attack, an adversary could launch a jamming attack to disrupt the delivery of congestion warning messages [83] , [94] , [122] , [123] . Thus, the route optimization fails to compute an efficient route to avoid congested areas. Attacks on a large scale could lead to the inefficient operation of many vehicles and maximize the occurrence of traffic jams in times of peak travel (rush-hour traffic). For example, adversaries can launch the least-effort attacks to maximize the average delay in specific target areas with a minimum number of vehicles (i.e., delay message delivery) [124] .
3) ATTACKS ON MANAGEMENT
Adversaries can launch attacks to disrupt the safety functions of smart transportation to compromise the safety of drivers and pedestrians. For instance, one real-world example is the spoofing of tire-pressure data from tire pressure sensors [97] , [98] , enabled by the lack of cryptographic mechanisms in communication protocols in-vehicle controller area networks (CANs). To disrupt emergency management, such as DAS, adversaries could inject false data in place of measurement data from in-vehicle sensors, such as the safe distance monitoring of adjacent vehicles, resulting in drivers making incorrect or unsafe decisions based on the false data [125] [126] [127] [128] [129] . To launch a large-scale attack, aggressive adversaries could inject false safe distance monitoring data to a number of vehicles simultaneously to cause the maximum number of accidents, which would be especially damaging during emergency scenarios. For example, under poor driving conditions, a large-scale accident could affect rescue vehicles and potentially evolve into be a public safety event.
B. ATTACKS ON SMART MANUFACTURING
In Table 2 , we present examples of attacks on smart manufacturing systems, including their definitions and impacts. We next elaborate attacks and their impacts from the perspectives of both a single attack and a large-scale attack, each against the three-layer architecture.
1) ATTACKS ON SERVICE
Due to the incredible business value and investment represented in any factory or industrial system, industrial things, including equipment, machinery, and processes, are attractive targets for cyber-attacks. Adversaries can launch single attacks to disrupt industrial activities in a closed-loop supply chain, or can implement large-scale attacks to cause disturbances across many critical services. For example, adversaries can attack inventory management stations and report false inventory information (e.g., low inventory) via spoofing [116] , [139] , [140] . The result will be inventory management falsely placing orders based on autonomous inventory management schemes. Depending on the industry and the companys capital investments, this could severely affect the profitability and value of the target company or owning corporation. In addition, adversaries can launch large-scale attacks on many inventory management stations of a global firm to manipulate the inventory management more broadly. For example, adversaries could control compromised stations to report false inventory information to the central station with a variety of schemes, such as low inventory for lowdemand areas and high inventory for high-demand areas. Thus, products will be oversupplied to low-demand areas and undersupplied to low-demand area inappropriately. This result will be greater imbalance in the supply and demand management, requiring significant wasted work to return or reallocate the products, as well as incurring many other negative impacts and overall economic loss [141] .
2) ATTACKS ON OPERATION
Aggressive adversaries are likely to attack the system operations (i.e., control systems) of critical manufacturing infrastructures to steal valuable manufacturing data or cause severe damage, if they have not already. For example, an adversary could capture an industrial process controller in a chemical plant to steal critical operation and parameter settings. In addition, adversaries can launch large-scale attacks on multiple control systems to cause severe damage. For example, the Stuxnet worm was utilized to access critical program logic controllers on Irans nuclear plant to caused substantial damage [117] , [142] [143] [144] [145] . As another example, adversaries could substitute false data for critical variables, such as pressure and temperature in massively deployed actuators, monitors, ovens, crucibles, etc. in chemical plants, resulting in hazardous public safety events, such as chemical release. Clearly, cyber-attacks on large-scale industrial plants, such as chemical plants, oil plants, and nuclear plants, can cause significant destruction, and even loss of life.
3) ATTACKS ON MANAGEMENT
In a massively connected environment enabled by industrial IoT, adversaries and bad actors will be motivated by selfinterest or competition to steal the valuable production information (e.g., type and volume of material productions) and even disrupt the production process to their benefit. For example, adversaries could launch individual attacks to capture sensors that identify defects in production on assembly lines via node capture attack. In this way, the adversaries could conduct illegitimate activities, adversely affect the defect rate, or simply collect valuable business data (e.g., estimated defective rate) for illegal trade or benefit. In addition, adversaries could launch large-scale attacks to circumvent or disable unified quality management services of factories that belong to a global firm or competitor [143] , [146] [147] [148] [149] [150] . The target would then be unable to accurately measure defects, possibly leading to overestimation of product quality and the production of a massive number of defective products, causing immense economic loss.
C. ATTACKS ON SMART GRID
In Table 3 , we list a variety of attack examples against the smart grid, providing their definitions and impacts. In the following, we illustrate the impacts of attacks in more detail from the perspectives of single small-scale and large-scale attacks for each of the three architecture layers.
1) ATTACKS ON SERVICE
Komninos [8] investigated a number of attacks on smart grid from direct load shifting to meter data manipulation. Specifically, as single, small-scale attacks, adversaries can control certain IoT devices, such as home appliances, in the smart grid. Using their control, an adversary can induce an abnormal working state in the device, increasing the power usage of the household. In certain cases, aggressive adversaries can cause damage to the devices and their surroundings, and even threaten the personal safety of users [134] , [151] [152] [153] . In terms of large-scale cyber-attacks, adversaries can compromise many high-wattage IoT devices to manipulate the power demand in a larger smart grid. For example, Soltan [133] demonstrated a large-scale attack model on real-world grids, using a botnet to turn on and off a large number of IoT devices synchronously, resulting in massive power fluctuations with the potential to cause a large-scale blackout.
2) ATTACKS ON OPERATION
Cyber-attacks can directly disrupt smart grid operations through disruption of transmission and distribution systems, VOLUME 7, 2019 demand response systems, and others [154] [155] [156] [157] . For example, in a single attack, an adversary can launch a spoofing attack on the distribution system to disable the power supply [135] . In particular, by spoofing the Global Positioning System (GPS) components installed in measurement devices in the smart grid, adversaries can provide false power demand information to the grid. Thus, normal operations in the smart grid will be disrupted. In addition, in a large-scale attack, adversaries can launch a DoS attack on the power substation network via the distributed network protocol (DNP3) [132] . For example, adversaries could use traffic flood attacks to delay the transmission of messages, using legitimate but useless user datagram protocol (UDP) traffic to occupy the communication channel. As a result, substation networks would be overloaded with heavy traffic, negatively impacting power grid transmission and distribution.
3) ATTACKS ON MANAGEMENT
Adversaries can launch attacks on the management layer of the smart grid to degrade system performance and cause the financial losses to both supply and demand interests [158] [159] [160] [161] . As a single attack, an adversary could send old energy usage messages in a replay attack [8] . The supply side would receive inaccurate demand information and manage or adjust their supply incorrectly. At the same time, demand side users would fail to accurately capture their consumed electricity. In terms of large-scale attacks, adversaries could jam time-critical messages (e.g., price, power usage) to disrupt or incapacitate the entire power market. For example, adversaries could jam the power price and price change signals [137] , [162] . Consumers who are affected by the attack will then take actions in response to the incorrect change or lack of change in the price of electricity. Adversaries could also predict the direction of changes and manipulate the price in the electricity market to disrupt smart grid management or achieve financial benefits. The abrupt change of power consumption due to costumer behavior will also negatively impact smart grid stability.
V. A CASE STUDY FOR INVESTIGATING CYBER-ATTACKS ON THE SMART TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
We now present a case study investigating the least-effort attack on the smart transportation system as an example to study the impacts of cyber-attacks on IoT systems. In particular, we study the attack impacts for different scales of attack, using the percentage of compromised smart transportation devices to quantize the attack scale. Note that the least-effort attack is intended to induce the most damage to the target (smart transportation system) while compromising the least number of devices (on-board and road-side units), thereby using an optimum or minimum volume of resources. In this scenario, we consider that adversaries can disrupt the vehicular network of the smart transportation system using a denialof-service attack by, while controlling the least number of compromised vehicles necessary. In addition, adversaries can disrupt vehicle traffic and cause congestion via manipulating a minimum number of Road-Side Units (RSUs), such as traffic lights. In the following, we present our simulation setup and the evaluation results.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We assume that adversaries can successfully attack smart transportation devices, such as On-Board Units (OBUs) and smart traffic lights. Note that the OBU is a central unit of a smart vehicle that interfaces with driver to collect information and handle message transmission. In this simulation, we assume that adversaries can directly manipulate message transmission and the frequencies of traffic lights. Nonetheless, the adversary cannot directly control the behaviors of drivers.
In this setup, we first consolidated a comprehensive testbed, composed of OMNET++, Veins, and SUMO [163] . The Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) is an opensource, continuous traffic simulator that can simulate vehicle traffic in a variety of parameters, with variable parameters such as the number of vehicles, road, vehicle speed, and so on. OMNET++ is a highly scalable network simulation framework that can integrate with many different modules. Veins is an open source framework that can integrate OMNET++ and SUMO to capture the interactions of vehicular networks and vehicle traffic. The communication protocol implemented for this simulation is 802.11p [163] .
In the implementation of our simulation, we use a map of Towson, Maryland, USA to model real-world road topologies, as shown in Fig. 6 . Additionally, in modeling traffic, we consider that vehicles could either enter or exit the main road from any possible side roads. Furthermore, we randomly generate the vehicles and their routes. The full list of our simulation parameters is presented in Table 4 , and includes simulation area, simulation time, number of trials, vehicles, and traffic lights.
To carry out the simulation study, we first use SUMO to generate the vehicle motion information. We then transfer the motion information to OMNET++ in real-time via transmission control protocol (TCP) port. Next, in OMNET++, we mount network modules to each vehicle. For convenience, we call these communication-ready vehicles nodes, which broadcast packets to all other nodes that within their range. With this setup, we ran the simulation 200 times to get the baseline of normal traffic conditions with zero compromised nodes, designated as normal operation.
B. ATTACK SCENARIOS
We now introduce the three attack scenarios investigated in this case study.
Attack on the vehicular network in the smart transportation system via compromised OBUs. Adversaries compromise nodes to disrupt the vehicular network by broadcasting redundant messages (e.g., replay attack). Note that normal nodes can broadcast the same message up to three times. Nonetheless, the compromised nodes will repeatedly broadcast the same message. Under this mechanism, we consider the following three attack strategies that can be leveraged by adversaries: (i) uniform distribution attack in which adversaries randomly compromise nodes with a uniform distribution, (ii) density-based attack in which adversaries always compromise nodes with the highest node density (i.e., the largest number of nodes in their communication range), and (iii) advanced density-based attack in which adversaries divide the road topology into many small areas and compromise nodes by highest node density in those areas.
Attack on the vehicle traffic in the smart transportation system via compromised RSUs (i.e., traffic lights). Adversaries compromise traffic lights to disrupt vehicle traffic (i.e., increase traffic congestion). Manipulating traffic lights to frequently change between stop and go, the overall travel delay will increase. Furthermore, using specific control logic, vehicles could be locked in certain areas. We assume that all vehicles will comply with the instructions of traffic lights. Under this mechanism, we design three attack strategies by implementing the following three distinct traffic light frequencies: (i) low frequency (i.e., the adversaries manipulate all traffic lights at a low frequency), (ii) random (i.e., the induced light transition frequencies are random), and (iii) high frequency (i.e., the induced frequency is rapid). Combined attack on the vehicular network and vehicle traffic in the smart transportation system via compromised OBUs and RSUs. Adversaries disrupt smart transportation system via manipulating both traffic lights and vehicle nodes to cause maximum damage with minimum cost.
C. EVALUATION RESULTS
Attack on the vehicular network in the smart transportation system via compromised OBUs. In assessing the impacts of this attack, we compare the network performance of the three attack strategies (i.e., uniform distribution attack, density-based attack, and advanced density-based attack). The network performance is measured by number of packets successfully received. As shown in Fig. 7 , to completely paralyze the network, an adversary does not necessarily need to compromise all nodes. Because the normal nodes will rebroadcast messages sent by compromised nodes, the attack can successfully occupy the channel resources to paralyze the network. We can also observe that, to completely paralyze the network, adversaries using the uniform distribution attack need to compromise the largest number of nodes, followed by the density-based attack, and advanced density attack. When network paralysis is not maximized, we can see that the uniform distribution and density-based attacks behave very similarly, while the advanced density-based attack is clearly much more effective.
Regarding the uniform distribution attack, adversaries need to compromise more nodes to ensure that the attack can affect every node in the network. Because the vehicle trajectory is random and mobility is high, compromised nodes will not stay within communication range of other nodes for long. Thus, the impact of nodes compromised under uniform distribution is limited. In the density-based attack, adversaries can generally attack more nodes with fewer compromised nodes, because, on average, there are more nodes near compromised nodes. Nonetheless, one issue for the densitybased attack is that compromised nodes are typically close together, which yields distinct stages in the effectiveness of the attack. This also explains why the results of the uniform distribution attack are better than when 20 %-40 % of vehicles are compromised. Finally, owing to the advanced densityattack dividing the global attack area into smaller sub-areas, VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 8. Average travel duration during attacks on vehicle traffic via compromised RSUs (i.e., traffic lights). this attack avoids the problem of compromised nodes being clustered in the same area. Thus, the advanced density-based attack achieves better performance with fewer compromised nodes to disrupt whole network.
Attack on the vehicle traffic in the smart transportation system via compromised RSUs (i.e., traffic lights). In this evaluation, we assess the impacts of attacks on traffic light frequencies (i.e., low, random, and high frequency) by comparing average travel durations and average wait times. Average travel duration is calculated as the average time from start to finish for all the vehicles to complete their routes. Additionally, the average wait time is calculated as the average time spent for all vehicles at a speed of less than 0.1 m/s. Combining both, we can sufficiently evaluate traffic congestion in various areas.
In Fig. 8 , we observe that manipulating traffic lights at a high frequency results in the highest average travel durations, in comparison with random and low frequency manipulation. When the traffic lights are induced to change with high frequency, the vehicles have a lower likelihood of driving through the intersection without slowing down, passively reducing the speed of all vehicles. In addition, as shown in Fig. 9 , vehicles will remain effectively stopped in the same place for longer. Indeed, the average wait time is increased significantly, especially under the high-frequency scheme, indicating that many vehicles were locked in a particular area for a long duration.
Attack on the vehicular network and vehicle traffic in the smart transportation system via compromised OBUs and RSUs. Recall that, in a smart transportation system, objects such as OBUs and RSUs are interconnected to maximize information sharing. The combined attack strategy (i.e., manipulating both OBUs and RSUs) can make the most of this trait to optimize and maximize the leverage of an attack. Note that compromised traffic lights can restrict vehicles to a particular area for a longer duration. Also, compromised vehicles can effectively disable the vehicle network. Thus, adversaries can compromise vehicles to broadcast false traffic messages in addition to manipulating traffic lights to maximize traffic congestion.
In this evaluation, we assess the performance of the combined attack strategy to paralyze the network and maximize traffic congestion. In particular, taking the most effective of both attack mechanisms, we combine the manipulation of traffic lights at high frequency with the advanced densitybased attack on vehicles. As shown in Fig. 10 , with only a small number of compromised traffic lights, the effectiveness of the compromised vehicle attack (i.e., disruption of network performance) is greatly increased. For example, when 10 % of traffic lights were compromised, the number of compromised nodes needed to disrupt entire network decreased by 10 % in comparison with no compromised traffic lights. Similarly, when 30 % of traffic lights were compromised, the number of compromised nodes required to disrupt entire network decreased by 20 % from the baseline.
Simultaneously, the addition of compromised vehicles can improve the efficiency of attacks against vehicular traffic (i.e., average travel duration) in comparison to only manipulating traffic lights. As shown in Fig. 11 , compromising 30 % of vehicles nearly doubles the average travel duration compared with the baseline. In summary, the hybrid attack strategy cause maximum damage to the target (i.e., operations in smart transportation) compared to the single domain attack strategies.
VI. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we discuss some research opportunities, outlining a series of research problems that need to be resolved as critical foundations to address the security issues raised by widespread IoT adoption. These research opportunities can be considered from a traditional three-phased security assessment framework that includes: (i) investigating risks of cyber-attacks, (ii) designing defensive schemes, and (iii) leveraging integrated evaluation platforms to protect IoT-based systems against cyber-attacks.
A. RISKS OF CYBER-ATTACKS
The investigation of vulnerabilities (e.g., software vulnerabilities, communication vulnerabilities, side-channel vulnerabilities) can help system designers to understand the security risks inside a particular system, and can be used explore adversarial models likely to be used in launching cyber-attacks. To investigate system vulnerabilities, the development of taxonomies to systematically explore potential vulnerabilities in smart grid, smart transportation, and smart manufacturing systems, and others, have been studied [9] , [164] , [165] . Despite the similarity of architectures in these key IoT-based systems, the service, operation and management of these systems are uniquely different. Thus, the investigation of vulnerabilities in IoT-based systems must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
With an understanding of potential vulnerabilities, the potential impacts of those vulnerabilities on specific key functions in the studied systems must also be investigated. For example, the impacts of vulnerabilities in power flow control, demand response, and energy pricing in the smart grid, traffic management, location-based service, and driving safety in the smart transportation system, as well as process control, real-time monitoring, and product inspection in the smart manufacturing system should be clearly assessed. Taking the smart grid as an example, an adversary could fully control smart plugs [166] to disrupt optimal power flow control by turning smart plugs on and off rapidly and repeatedly to generate misleading demand reports, leading to inefficient load management, as well as to cause power fluctuations the may result in grid blackouts.
Further, we should consider that an adversary will consider manipulating a variety of assorted parameters (e.g., the duration for launching attacks, spatial distribution of IoT devices, and the number of devices to be compromised) to achieve their attack goals in time, space, and strength. Thus, it becomes necessary to model and analyze the impacts of attacks that consider various combinations of factors (attack parameters, strategies, etc.) in time, space, and strength. For instance, an investigation should be conducted to find optimal strategies for selecting a set of smart plugs to compromise and the magnitudes of their controlled outputs needed to maximize the attack damage. With these strategies, the risks inherent to the system can be established, and intelligent defensive schemes can be devised.
B. DEFENSIVE SCHEMES
The design of defensive schemes to protect against cyberattacks and secure IoT-based systems is another critical issue. Generally speaking, defensive schemes can be allocated into four processes: (i) designing resilient IoT-based systems, (ii) investigating optimal IoT-based system configurations, (iii) detecting cyber-attacks effectively, and (iv) responding to cyber-attacks in a timely manner.
First, from the perspective of system design, a resilient IoTbased system requires tamper-resistant hardware and resilient firmware and software. It is incumbent on the manufacturers of IoT devices to apply adequate security techniques to all components of their products, including software, hardware, and communication components, such that, once implemented in any system, the user has confidence that the manufactured devices are secure. In addition, it is incumbent on any system designer to apply security best-practices and understand the limitations of the devices implemented in their system. To better achieve these needs, it is necessary to develop taxonomies for techniques to secure IoT devices (e.g., securing software, improving the security of communication components, and others). Moreover, while the investigation of protection mechanisms to implement in IoT-based systems, making them difficult to compromise, have been investigated [5] , [167] , [168] , more work is needed.
As an example of enhancing the resilience of a component, we can enhance the resilience of the Kalman filter techniques [169] , enabling the component to adapt to noise dynamically and better handle certain attacks. Particularly, when the predicted measurement and received measurement deviate significantly, it could increase the absolute residual vector subsequently increases the measurement noise so that Kalman gain can be reduced. This will reduce the weight of received measurements in the estimation and preserve the estimation performance. Conversely, if the deviation between the predicted measurement and received measurement is small, the reduction in absolute residual vector shall raise only marginal change in the measurement noise, yielding only a small impact on the estimation results.
Additionally, the investigation of modeling results and their adaptation into the design of resilient systems from physical and network structures and components must be considered. On important strategy is to design protection mechanisms that increase attack costs. Using the power grid as an example, to make the power grid more resilient to attacks [5] , improving the resiliency of particular critical sensors to against attacks has been proposed, which increases attack costs based on the power grid structure model. That is, VOLUME 7, 2019 because power grids usually cover large geographical areas, it is more practical for system operators to choose some ''important sensors and actuators'' from the entire set of meters to protect, which leverages the integration of cryptography, threat monitoring and control, and other mechanisms. For example, using the IEEE 14-bus system to conduct experiments, Yang et al. [5] demonstrated that, when particular buses were secured, the number of state variables that adversaries must manipulate to affect an attack was significantly increased, in contrast to when buses were protected at random. In this case, applying more costly and complex security mechanisms to a few components may be more cost effective than securing all components with less costly mechanisms.
Moreover, to ensure the safe operation of IoT systems, optimal system configurations for IoT-based systems must be investigated. Specifically, IoT device placement, monitoring, control, software update and maintenance scheduling, and so on must be considered in tandem. The diverse services enabled by disparate IoT-based systems may be highly dependent on optimal system configuration, including the optimal deployment of key components. For example, the optimal deployment strategy for phasor measurement units (PMUs) in the smart grid has been considered to secure other nearby smart grid IoT devices, and is able to defend against the false data injection attacks [37] . In this case, the optimal strategy for false data injection attacks was formulated using a least-effort attack model and the design of PMU deployment strategies demonstrated the ability to defend against these data integrity attacks. Additionally, the deployment of PMUs enabled system observability with low overhead [37] . In a similar manner, it is critical to explore these and other methods for securing IoT-based systems more broadly and in scenarios generic to all CPS domains.
In the design of effective anomaly detection schemes, it is necessary to leverage both spatial and temporal correlations [5] , [162] , [170] [171] [172] , along with the recent advance of big data analysis and machine learning [173] , [174] . In terms of spatially-based detection, the application of machine learning and statistical schemes are possible based on the understanding that, to cause damage to IoT-based systems, the behavior of compromised sensors and malicious actuators must deviate more from the mean behavior than devices under regular use with random noise. In terms of temporally-based detection, it is well understood that adversaries may launch slow and stealthily attacks (e.g., stealthily and marginally manipulating sensors and actuators over time to cause damage over a long period of time). As a difficult strategy to identify and defend against, it is necessary to consider schemes such as nonparametric cumulative sum schemes to handle such stealthy attacks. These method accumulate small deviations in the observed sensors and actuators until the value approaches a given threshold. Advanced machine learning techniques (deep learning, etc.) should also be considered and applied in detecting cyber-attacks in IoT-based systems [173] , [174] , together with the assistant of distributed computing infrastructure such as edge/fog computing [3] . The effectiveness of detection algorithms can be characterized by detection rate, false positive rate, detection time, and other metrics related to attack damage and impact on critical infrastructure systems.
It is also imperative to study efficient techniques to detect compromised IoT devices. For example, to attack smart meters, an adversary could launch an attack via sending malicious code propagating traffic over the network so that malicious code can be injected into other devices. Thus, it is critical to consider perspectives such as software behavior and network traffic so that detection accuracy can be improved. Once an attack is detected, schemes must be in place to identify compromised devices and isolate them. For example, one such scheme has been proposed to adopt an efficient watermarking-based forensic trace-back scheme [165] . In this scheme, a covert signal (binary bits of 1 and 0) is used to embedded into the meter data stream. When the meter data stream is changed by any compromised device within the transmission path, the receiver can conduct a similarity-based correlation test based on the embedded covert signal to decide whether the data stream has been manipulated by adversary. Via repeating such a procedure over the data transmission path, the origin of the manipulated data can be traced.
Finally, after the cyber-attacks have been successfully detected, response plans must be in place to minimize damage to IoT-based systems and recover them from attacks. To minimize attack impacts, the isolation of the disrupting devices must be carried out while maintaining key services and operational functions. There are a variety of methods available to recover service, operation, and management to normal conditions, and these should be investigated and applied such that the response is implemented in a timely manner.
C. INTEGRATED EVALUATION PLATFORMS
To understand the risks of cyber-attacks on IoT-based systems and validate the effectiveness of defensive schemes, it is necessary to design an integrated evaluation testbed. As an IoT-based system comprises components from both the physical domain and the cyber domain, it is critical to develop system-level modeling and simulation tools to study the interactions between physical components (power grid, transportation system, and manufacturing system) and cyber components (communication networks and computing infrastructure). An integrated simulation platform can capture the interactions and reciprocal effects between communication networks and physical systems, which can be used to evaluate attack impacts on the performance and security of communication networks and computing infrastructures in IoT-based systems.
In designing and implementing a an IoT co-simulation platform, taking the smart grid as an example, the Fenix framework for Network Co-Simulation (FNCS) [11] developed by PNNL, which integrates both GridLAB-D and NS-3, is a strong candidate. FNCS is an open source co-simulation tool for studying interactions between cyber components and power grid applications. It can be used to study how the performance of the network will impact the effectiveness of the smart grid as a whole. More specifically, using FNCS, we can describe the interactions between the power grid, communication networks, and computational algorithms, and characterize the uncertainties raised by cyber-attacks by compromising actuators (e.g., smart plugs) and sensors.
Another example is the integrated testbed utilized in the case study outlined above, which includes OMNET++, SUMO, and Veins for simulating vehicular networks in the smart transportation system [45] . Here, OMNET++ is a network simulator that can model the communication network for mobile nodes, such as vehicles. The simulation of urban mobility (SUMO) can generate various parameters to describe vehicle networks, including traffic flows, traffic density, road topologies, and vehicle speed, among others. Finally, Veins is a framework to capture the interactions between vehicular communication network and road traffic, tying the other two components together. Using this integrated testbed, we can capture the interactions between vehicular networks and the transportation system, and characterize the impacts of cyber-attacks by compromising vehicles and RSUs (e.g., traffic lights), as demonstrated.
Additionally, the wireless cyber-physical simulator (WCPS), which integrates Simulink and TOSSIM, can capture interactions between physical systems and wireless sensor and actuator networks [46] . The Simulink component of WCPS can model, simulate, and analyze multi-domain dynamic systems, such as process control systems, structural control systems, and others [46] , [175] , [176] . Meanwhile, TOSSIM simulates TinyOS wireless sensor networks, capturing data delivery between sensors and base stations. In WCPS, the sensed data will be fed to controllers based on the captured data delivery performance (i.e., loss and delay) to model the actuating domain. With WCPS, we can describe the interactions between manufacturing systems and wireless sensor and actuator networks, and characterize the impacts of cyber-attacks by compromising actuators (e.g., controllers) and sensors.
VII. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we have provided a detailed consideration of the security of IoT-based critical infrastructures. Specifically, we have considered a broad range of vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to intrude in critical systems. We have assessed three key IoT smart-systems applications, namely Smart Transportation, Smart Manufacturing, and the Smart Grid from the perspective of a three-tiered architecture of service layer, operation layer, and management layer. We have provided a variety of attack types for each application and layer, as well as examples for every case. Additionally, we have carried out a case study, using the Smart Transportation system as an example, that considered the impacts of attacks of varying strengths and types, and demonstrated the efficacy of least effort attacks in crippling complex IoT systems. Finally, we have outlined some research opportunities for security risk assessment, developing countermeasures, and designing integrated evaluation platforms to evaluate the impacts of attacks and the effectiveness of countermeasures.
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